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1 Barack Obama’s election to the presidency in 2008 was greeted in most of Europe with joy,
or at least relief, an emotion that was shared in a great many precincts in the United
States. In both venues a curious mix of language attended these celebrations. A new day
had dawned, it was said; the American people had turned a page to give themselves, and
the rest of the world, a fresh start. Paradoxically, that meant that the USA would return
to being its  old,  familiar  self—a country that  played by the rules  and acted friendly
toward its  neighbors,  consulting them about mutual  interests rather than rampaging
around like a rogue elephant.   
2 It  is  the  mixed themes  of  old  and new,  fresh  and familiar,  that  might  be  the  most
illuminating feature of this response. And since associating America with the “new” is
altogether predictable, it is the role of the “old” in the mix that merits further scrutiny.
Nor should the old be introduced simply as a counter-weight to create an ironic balance;
instead, we should consider it fully and in its own right. Thus, the leading question of this
essay, a question designed to provoke a new line of reflection across all our disciplines.
We can call it history’s revenge upon Donald Rumsfeld: on the current scene, is it not
America instead of  Europe that  is  “old”? More precisely,  what new insights into the
United States in its current condition, in its art and literature, its history and politics,
issue from our putting on a markedly new pair of glasses and viewing the United States as
an aging country? 
 
2. Ever-New, or Ageing?
3 That seeing America as old is a new approach can be illustrated from the opening remarks
that  the  subject  of  my Fulbright  project,  Abraham Kuyper,  made  in  the  lectures  he
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delivered at Princeton in 1898, where he had traveled to receive an honorary doctorate.
Kuyper began:
A traveler from the old European Continent, disembarking on the shore of this New
World.  .  .  [senses that]  the old stream of  life  in which he has been moving [is]
almost  frost-bound  and  dull.  Here,  on  American  ground,  for  the  first  time,  he
realizes how so many divine potencies, which were hidden away in the bosom of
mankind  from  our  very  creation  but  which  our  old  world  was  incapable  of
developing, are now beginning to disclose their inward splendor, thus promising a
still richer store of surprises for the future.1
4 There is a theological idiom in these phrases that is particular to Kuyper, but otherwise
we recognize here a very common sentiment of learned visitors to America. Crévecoeur,
Trollope, Tocqueville, Dickens, and Bryce: whatever else they said, with whatever tone,
and whatever final evaluations they drew, these observers and a host of others agreed
that America was new and different, that on those shores a fundamentally new project
was being undertaken with great import for the rest of the world.
5 They had plenty of Americans at hand to assure them that this was so. In the founding
generation,  from Ezra  Stiles  in  New England to  Thomas  Jefferson in  Virginia  to  the
forgers of the Great Seal of the United States, it was agreed that the new nation spelled “a
new order of the ages.”2 The canonical figures of the mid-nineteenth-century American
literary  renaissance—Emerson,  Whitman,  Melville—might  have  disagreed  about  other
things but agreed that their young and rising nation deserved a whole new literature.3
The great  politicians  have  followed along:  Lincoln  with  his  “new birth  of  freedom,”
Theodore Roosevelt’s New Nation, Woodrow Wilson’s New Freedom, Franklin Roosevelt’s
New Deal, John Kennedy’s New Frontier—they all share the magic adjective. American
Studies as an academic enterprise was launched in the 1950s with major titles evoking the
same theme: Virgin Land by Henry Nash Smith, The Machine in the Garden by Leo Marx,
this garden presumably being another Eden, wherein, according to R. W. B. Lewis, dwelt
The American Adam. The theme, finally, comes down to the present day, as the United
States wrestles in the grip of the ideology fixed around the body politic by Ronald Reagan,
whose most memorable phrases included the assurance that “it is morning in America.”4 
6 Ronald Reagan also happened to be the oldest person ever to occupy the Oval Office, and
by several accounts his last years therein were marked by incipient senility—and not in
the metaphorical but in the clinical sense of the term. That paradox parallels a much
larger irony attending the familiar trope of America the new. “America as new” is one of
the oldest, most tradition-worn ways to view the United States. To see America as old
instead might promise us a fresh start; in any case, it requires new lenses. I am not drawn
to this question out of an academic fascination with irony, however, but from a public
conversation that has been increasing in volume over the last few years in the United
States, a conversation that registers a concern across the spectrum of public opinion that
the country has taken a down-turn into the heretofore uncharted territory of constraint
and decline. The United States faces, so these observers hold, the prospect of diminished
power  abroad  relative  to  the  rising  nations  in  the  world,  and  a  future  of  reduced
possibilities  at  home spelled by crimped budgets.  Its  repertoire of  politically feasible
policies  dooms it  to  orbit  in  ever-tighter  circles  around obligations  entailed  by  past
commitments,  be they noble or mistaken; and its rhetorical repertoire ranges from a
president who says that “we can” (and seems to mean, we can survive this) to the hosts of
right-wing radio whose fulminations amount to one great shriek: this can’t be happening
to us!  Reduced strength,  reduced mobility,  reduced flexibility,  reduced resources,  the
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constraints of the past and the iron cage of memory: if we hear these symptoms described
of a person, we would readily (and correctly) conclude that he or she is aging, and not so
gracefully. 
7 At this point an American audience is conditioned to expect a sudden rhetorical reversal
—an assurance  that  what  goes  for  a  person  does  not  necessarily  hold  for  a  nation,
followed by a recital of the reserves and potential that promise a return to vitality should
only this new attitude or that new policy pill be taken. But this essay is not a Viagra
commercial. The symptoms of an aging America are real. They may not be the whole
picture, but they are major components in it and perhaps the frame besides. I cannot say
this is an entirely new phenomenon in American history because, this being an unusual
question,  we  have  not  generated  the  historiographical  record  to  tell  how  new,  or
recurrent,  the  United  States’  present  circumstances  might  be.  I  would  venture  as  a
working  hypothesis  that,  although  the  U.S.  has  experienced  foreshadowings  of  this
condition  before,  these  have  seldom  gathered  in  such  a  perfect  storm  and  without
plausible relief on the horizon. The good news in this situation for academics is that,
prodded by circumstances to explore within a new paradigm, we might come up with
fresh insights that could be of real service not just to our future careers but to a larger
public.  The even better news for readers of this journal is  that European scholars in
American studies are especially well positioned to help in this regard.
8 Detailing the symptoms of America as ageing could easily absorb the rest of this essay,
but as those comments would neither be original nor that suggestive for our scholarly
work, I will give a brief sketch under the metaphor of an ageing couple trying to carry on
in  the  old  house  where  they  raised  their  children.  The  title  to  this  property  (the
Constitution) is almost 225 years old, and the building, or infrastructure, last renovated
sixty years ago, is showing alarming signs of deterioration, as state governors, newspaper
columnists, think tanks, and university experts have been pointing out now for a couple
decades.  Yet  the  residents  are  worried  about  their  fixed  income  and  so  refuse  to
undertake the significant short-term borrowing that would yield long-term benefits. This
particular couple,  as part of  the Greatest Generation,  profited immensely,  along with
their own, now middle-aged children, from massive public investments made after World
War II; but somewhere in their own middle age they became convinced by Ronald Reagan,
himself  an  abject  beneficiary  of  public  largesse,  that,  in  their  current  situation,
“government is not the solution, government is the problem.”5 On the other hand, our
couple  will spend without  stint  on  anything  labeled  “security.”  However  much their
elected representatives pick over any discretionary social spending, they will  pass an
annual defense budget of over $700 billion with virtually no discussion or objection. Our
retirees will also open their wallets for perceived neighborhood safety, particularly to
lock up young men of color for non-violent offenses. Thus the American house still stands
tall in the global village on certain indices: it controls nearly half of the world’smilitary
expenditures,  two-thirds  of  the international  weapons trade,  and imprisons a  higher
percentage of its citizens than does any other nation in the world—more than Russia,
more than Columbia, more than China, South Africa, Nigeria, more than Belarus.6 Never
mind that military spending has a lower multiplier effect for economic growth than does
infrastructure investment. Never mind that a year in jail costs almost as much as a year at
Yale. "Millions for the military, sir, but not one cent for welfare!"
9 Hyper-sensitive though they are about their limited means, as is not unknown among
ageing people our American household is still susceptible to scams and risky speculation.
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Most recently this was a massive real estate bubble whose explosion sent a shock through
the entire world economy and has left the home-front struggling for revival. Nor does
any widespread recovery appear in the offing. The bankers’ downtown penthouses are
safe, and the professional neighborhood up the hill is holding on, but along ordinary
middle-class  streets,  values  are  down  and  properties  foreclosed  or  abandoned.
Consequently the neighbors are all saving against an evil day rather than spending and
restarting the economy. Unemployment is near 10 percent; underemployment over 20
percent.7 Figures for traditionally vulnerable sectors like young males of color are far
worse, but the prospects for white males lacking advanced education are moving in the
same direction with no end in sight.8 The social dysfunctions that our retired couple have
long associated with the black inner-city are—and have been—rising without evident
curtailment among rural, working-class, and even middle-class whites. When, in face of
this  dire  prospect,  our  elderly  couple—unable  to  spend  any  more  on  prisons,  and
reluctant to invest in schools—turns to its  political  class for leadership,  they see the
arteriosclerosis  of  the  body  politic.  The  current  government  has  as  strong  and
consolidated a majority as any since the early days of Reagan, but as the travail over the
recent,  relatively  modest  reform to  the  nation’s  health-care  system demonstrated,  a
filibustering forty senators can block or at least dilute any approach toward the bold
changes  needed  for  recovery  or  sound  investment  going  forward.  Not  that  the
representatives  among  the  majority  are  guilt-free;  they  too  are  locked  up  by
commitments made to raise the cash needed to get elected in the first place.9 
10 But  what  is  most  striking  in  the  present  circumstance  is  our  couple’s  constricted
imagination—a constriction predictable at their later stage of life but foreign to their
younger years. A trillion dollars of their money went to a war of choice in Iraq on the
insistence of old men from the Nixon administration who, among other motives, were
determined to exorcise once and for all the memory of defeat in Vietnam.10 Tuning in to
television, our couple can hear the most popular speaker at the recent convention of self-
described  Conservatives,  Glenn  Beck,  declare  that  the  entire  record  of  progressive
legislation going back to and including Theodore Roosevelt needs to be wiped off the
map.11 That is, Gilded Age policies for the not so golden years at hand. And why not?
Income stratification in the American apartment complex is nearing that of the Gilded
Age, and bankers and entrepreneurs of new industries are once again triggering panics
and collapses.12 Railroads then, hi-tech now; Jay Cooke then, Lehman Brothers now; and J.
P. Morgan all the time. If neither the return to Vietnam nor to the Gilded Age goes back
far enough, there is the solution posited by Tea Party devotees and some Supreme Court
justices: a return to the plain and simple meaning of the original Constitution, as if two
centuries had not happened in the meantime. The most popular icon (using the word in
its religious sense) of this mentality is the firearm, and the individual’s right to bear the
same is taken to be the most sacred and inviolable of rights. Miranda rights, the right to a
jury trial, even citizenship itself may be stripped from an accused terrorist by state fiat,
on this thinking, but not that same person’s right to own an assault weapon. Never mind
that the successful overturning of oppressive regimes around the world over the last
quarter century have all occurred without armed uprisings; the American populist today
is  fixated  upon  the  eighteenth-century  frontiersman  and  his  musket.  Bold,  new,
innovative  thinkers  and  can-do  confidence?  Look  not  to  America,  frozen  in  fear,
nostalgia, and bills overdue. 
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3. A European Advantage?
11 In light of this picture, what might European academics do? I suggest that they exploit
their  advantage  as  outsiders  and  let  a  comparative,  pragmatic,  and  post-imperial
sensibility  infuse  their  Americanist  researches.  Post-imperial,  in  that  Europeans  have
already  lost  their  empires  and  have  come  to  terms  with  that,  economically  and
psychologically, in a constructive way. Remarkably constructive, I would say, in light of
so many Americans’ inability to imagine a state of less than complete world hegemony
without fear and loathing—fear for their own security, and loathing for the specter of
weakness  such  a  situation  would  supposedly  spell.  We  should  push  the  bottom-line
question: When were Europeans more prosperous and content, then or now? During their
imperial phase or after? I think the answer is clear, and analyzing how your nation came
to terms with and prospered after the loss of empire could provide a research agenda for
European American studies, as well as a reassuring word to Americans. 
12 First of all post-imperial, then, and secondly pragmatic. As Americanists we can appreciate
the irony of the fact that, arriving in Europe, this American feels compelled to repeat
Lincoln Steffens’ dictum upon visiting the Soviet Union in 1921: “I have been over into the
future, and it works.” Obviously, I repeat this with some trepidation since, in the long
run, the USSR did not work, and right now the ripple effect of the crisis in Greek finances
throughout  the  euro-zone  augurs  fiscal  and  commercial  difficulties  of  significant
dimensions.  Still,  it  is  important  to  list  the  significant  ways  that  Europe has  turned
toward a workable future and that America has not. Much of Europe offers an integrated
transportation system that is not dedicated to profligate use of fossil fuels for maximum
individual convenience; it is embracing, rather than resisting, alternative energy sources;
it is not religiously denying climate change; it is providing relatively affordable health
care for all on a variety of models; its future citizens as school children perform relatively
well on tests of basic competency. Europe’s children do lag, admittedly, in reported self-
esteem and manifest obesity, but these are good races to lose. So let us for once send
those nineteenth-century questions back across the ocean: How do Europeans make it
work? From the shambles of World War II, how did they get here? What did they have to
give up in the process? What of this was a genuine loss? This last is not a rhetorical
question, for American fears that moving forward might cost something precious should
not be dismissed out of hand. To glimpse some measure of that cost in a European mirror
would be at least instructive, perhaps even comforting. 
13 Finally,  as  these  proposals  suggest,  European  Americanists  should  be  comparative.
However it might be in other disciplines, this is an encouraging trend in American history
right now, signaled by the publication of Thomas Bender’s A Nation Among Nations (2006).13
European  academics’  remarkable  bi-  and  tri-lingualism,  especially  compared  with
Americans’ lingua-phobia, affords a wonderful advantage that they should exploit. With
access to a wide range of sources and within a broader frame of reference, they might
offer alternative narratives, alternative frameworks of meaning, alternative landscapes of
imagination. These are the ingredients of vision, and again, just now it is genuinely new
vision that the United States lacks. 
14 Informed by such a sensibility, what sort of research programs could be undertaken? The
most obvious one might be dubbed “comparative slumpology.” Critics of the America-as-
old trope are quick to point out that the United States has hit the wall before, that it
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recurrently emits noises of decline and foreboding. Think of Madison Grant’s lament over
The Passing of the Great Race (1916) and Theodore Roosevelt’s concomitant call that the
“better” types in American society breed more vigorously lest the lesser sorts run off
with the country.  These manifestos were accompanied by the greatest  outpouring of
utopian and dystopian fiction in all of American history, as a small-town agrarian order
tried to come to terms imaginatively with an urban-industrial system.14 Further back, no
sooner was the War for Independence over than voices elite and popular from across the
whole spectrum of Patriot opinion announced that the cause of liberty was being lost—
lost  forever!—to corruption and conspiracy.  Farther back yet,  of  course,  we hear the
jeremiad  rehearsed  so  repeatedly  as  to  become  a  fundamental  type  of  American
literature.15 These cultural expressions often coincided with economic collapses, or wars,
or both. To repeat an earlier question: do the current mood of atrophy and the material
forces  behind  it  parallel  or  significantly  diverge  from  these  earlier  passages?
Programmatic suggestion #1, then, is to study when and why these slumps occurred, how
they were redressed, and what may (or may not) be different about the crisis this time. 
15 My second suggestion is one I have already followed, and that is to study the down-turn of
movements, be they political, social, or religious. Religion not only happens to be my own
focus in American history but, especially in its Protestant evangelical form, offers special
insight into the dynamics of revival and decline. I find American religious historians, like
American historians more generally, devoted as much as sales-agents to the study of new
beginnings, bright possibilities, the launch- and growth-phases of their subjects, to the
relative neglect of the inevitable phases of institutionalization or decline. Some of my
own work has addressed this bias with respect to the surge of evangelical revivalism in
the  first  third  of  the  nineteenth  century,  commonly  known  as   the  “Second  Great
Awakening.”16 What no historian had examined systematically, I discovered upon looking
into the subject, was what happened when charisma finally failed, when the fires of the
spirit had burned too hot or too long, when the circuit-rider dismounted and Charles
Finney left the revival trail to become, of all things, a professor of systematic theology.
Why was it that the Second Great Awakening did not, as promised, prevent but stoked the
Civil War which, whatever else it was, amounted to a consummate failure of the political
and cultural formulae to which antebellum evangelicals were dedicated? In the process of
reconstructing the down-phase of this story, I discovered it not to be one of unrelieved
failure. From the ashes of revivalistic excess emerged a wide array—left, right, and center
across  the  theological  spectrum—of  creative  new departures  which together,  already
before the Civil War, set the template of religious options that prevailed in the US until
the 1930s. Studies of downsides can uncover the genuinely new. 
16 Asking questions about perceived ageing and defeat can also, thirdly, open a new eye
upon American regionalism.  The most obvious candidate here is the South, as C. Vann
Woodward  suggested  long  ago,  but  there  are  enough  other  candidates  to  make  the
“afflicted-region” approach more broadly viable.17 As a resident-native of Michigan I have
been watching a whole state suffer catastrophe in slow motion for ten years now. In that
time  my  state  lost  nearly  a  quarter  million  prime  auto-manufacturing  jobs.  Public
revenue in Michigan next fiscal year, adjusted for inflation, will approximate one half of
what it was just twelve years ago. The city of Detroit has fewer people today than it did
ninety years ago. A whole auto industry arose, thrived, and then withered in less than a
century, leaving behind rusted plants, shattered office buildings, over-extended utilities,
and forty square miles (the area of San Francisco) of abandoned space within the city
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limits.18 Anyone  who  has  contemplated  the  ruins  of  Ephesus  or  traced  the  old
circumference  of  Cahokia  will,  driving  through  Detroit  (or  Cleveland,  or  Buffalo),
suddenly realize what heretofore has been inconceivable to the American mind: it can 
happen here, to us.
 
4. Chances of Revival
17 But American history also holds instances of old regions reviving. Consider New England
in 1818.  By then it  was nearly 200 years old and three generations down a lowering
trajectory that made it seem destined to become the American equivalent of the Canadian
Maritimes: marginal,  quaint,  and left behind. Worse, to bulwarks of its old order like
Timothy Dwight, that year the church in Connecticut lost its official standing. But by 1825
Dwight’s disciple Lyman Beecher was exulting that this was the best thing that could ever
happen to the cause of religion, as it prompted him to devise the voluntaristic measures
that created the “benevolence empire” of a united evangelical front. This empire waxed
strongest along the Erie Canal, also completed in 1825, along which streamed the New
England diaspora into the upper Midwest.19 In this case a bipartisan public works project
by New York state coupled with an imaginative breakthrough by people like Beecher
helped dramatically reverse the fortunes and influence of an old, once-declining region.
We should investigate how the same generations of succession transpired in the now
truly old West, in the repeated makeovers of Virginia, etc.
18 Let  me  suggest,  finally,  that  some  ancient  ideological  strains  can  offer  promising
resources  for  understanding  and  dealing  with  decline.  Let  us  return  to  evangelical
Protestantism as an example. Evangelicalism is dedicated to the new—new birth to start
with, and renewed people, fresh glimpses of God, and ceaseless liturgical innovation in its
train. But evangelicalism as we know it is 275 years old, dating back to the simultaneous
work in the late 1730s of Jonathan Edwards, the brothers Wesley, and George Whitefield
on either side of the Atlantic. Its elite forms postulated an early claim upon public life in
the young republic,  and its populist forms proclaimed that theirs was a new religion
(while simultaneously being the very same as apostolic Christianity) perfectly fit for a
new nation—a nation and religion alike free from the past, free from tradition, free from
old Europe. As Mark Noll has detailed in America’s God, evangelicalism was exceptionally
well adapted to antebellum America.20 Over-adapted, as it turned out. Evangelicals could
not see beyond their original assumptions and so mostly became captives of the culture
instead of the prophetic critics they might have been. I would go further and say that
evangelicals  have  never  shaken  this  molding;  that,  however  much  their  trappings,
technologies,  and idioms might have changed since,  in their notions of salvation and
especially in their social ethic they remain fixed at around 1850, slavery excepted. They
remain free-will, free-market individualists combining small-group social formation with
a conviction that America is God’s chosen nation, emphasizing strong personal discipline,
the litmus test of which is right sexual behavior. 
19 Anyone who has looked into Sarah Palin’s thought and following has seen the noxious
ends to which these assumptions can lead: a proprietary claim upon America for just this
circle of believers, allegations that political opponents are demon-possessed, a militant
Christian Zionism uninformed by the Hebrew prophetic tradition, grave suspicion of big
banks—and  rejection  of  any  government  regulation  thereof;  deep  suspicion  of  big
government—except for a national security apparatus whose total annual budget now
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exceeds $1 trillion; specious allegations about government-appointed death panels—and
praise for torture, rendition, and wars of choice. This, surely, is the sour dead-end of a
tradition premised on new life. 
20 But there are evangelicals  and there are evangelicals.  American evangelicals  are also
among the most generous private donors of aid to sick, indigent, homeless, and displaced
people around the world. They are the Americans most persistently concerned with and
effectively alleviating the suffering associated with the AIDS-HIV epidemic in Africa. They
show the highest consciousness of any Americans about Darfur. They work not only to
provide emergency relief but to build programs of long-term development to be run as
soon as possible by indigenous talent.  If  you’re a betting person and you run into a
Western-founded health clinic or micro-finance project abroad, put your money on it
having  Roman  Catholic  or  American  evangelical  roots.  Back  home,  American
evangelicalism has over the last twenty years grown a green wing, mindful that the world
is not a commodity but God’s creation to be tended and preserved. Younger evangelicals




21 My purpose here is not to give a brief for or against American evangelicalism, but to use
this particular slice of America that I know best to give what I think is a fair illustration of
the potential for good and ill that lies within so many American movements, as in the
nation  itself.  I  hope  that,  over  the  careers  that  lie  ahead  of  them,  young  European
Americanists will find a way to bend their teaching and research to ease in some way the
difficult transition the United States is undergoing. Here’s the Viagra commercial after
all: nations and cultures are finally different from persons; the collective condition never
has to be terminal. 
22 When  Lincoln  delivered  his  first  Inaugural  Address,  the  United  States  faced,  mostly
unwittingly, the death of its accustomed order and the death of a very great many of its
young men. Lincoln hoped, in vain, that the swelling chorus of the Union would drown
out the antipathies in his audience. I think less of that Union than did Lincoln; I think it is
composed irremediably of sound and toxic strains. Yet it is still  worthwhile for us to
consider how our work can support the notes arising, in Lincoln’s beautiful words, from
the better angels of our nature. These do not have to offer re-birth or resurrection, just
some light—whether new or old—down a long road.
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